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Judicial confirmations are often the subject of political debate.  
Recently, much of the discussion has focused on the Trump 
administration’s and Republican senators’ success in nominating and 
confirming federal judges.  Irrespective of this success, consistently 
growing caseloads continue to overburden many federal district courts, 
leading to unnecessary cost and delay.  This essay surveys the current 
judicial capacity crisis in many district courts and Congress’ struggles to 
resolve it.  It then turns to short-term solutions that courts have used to 
alleviate their expanding burdens and highlights the federal courts’ most 
successful short-term solution: the federal magistrate judge system.  This 
essay then introduces the origins and modern structure of the federal 
magistrate judge system and argues that, until Congress is able to pass 
substantive judgeship legislation, an ambitious expansion of this program 
would best serve struggling district courts.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Most commentary about the federal court system focuses on the 
Supreme Court.  This is for good reason.  The Supreme Court is the 
highest court in the nation, and its decisions have the potential to affect 
nearly every corner of society.  But for the vast majority of Americans, 
their legal disputes will never pass through the large bronze doors on 1 
First Street NE.  For them, their federal cases will begin—and end—in 
one of the 94 U.S. district courts around the country.  
Many of these district courts are suffering from a capacity crisis.  Due 
to a combination of growing caseloads and insufficient judgeships, case 
delays are on the rise and civil litigants are losing their day in court.  This 
is not an unfamiliar problem for lawmakers.  Thirty years ago, Congress, 
deploring case delays and overburdened courts, increased the number of 
available district court judgeships.  In the following years, as the national 
 
* Governance Project Fellow, R Street Institute; LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center, J.D., Rutgers 
University Law School, B.A., The Ohio State University.  Special thanks to the Hon. James E. Seibert 
(Ret.) and the Hon. Andrea K. Johnstone for the opportunities to clerk in their chambers and the time to 
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Pesavento and Lauren Rollins for their review of earlier drafts.  And, a final thanks to the editors of the 
University of Cincinnati Law Review for their comments and review during a uniquely challenging time. 
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population and case filings have increased, case delays have also soared, 
frustrating both litigants and judges.   Much of the blame can be attributed 
to Congress.  After all, legislation is difficult to pass on a bipartisan basis, 
and the problem becomes even more complex when one political party 
has little incentive to award a president of another party the chance to 
nominate additional federal judges.  
In the meantime, district courts lacking sufficient judgeships have 
employed a variety of creative methods to manage the hundreds of 
thousands of cases filed each year.  The most effective of these has been 
the expansion of the federal magistrate judge system.  This system, 
created by Congress over fifty years ago, employs Article I judicial 
officers to work in tandem with Article III judges to manage cases and 
improve the workflow in the federal district courts.  
As both judges and scholars recognize, this little-discussed system has 
become “nothing less than indispensable” to the federal judiciary.1  Given 
this success, until federal lawmakers are able to produce significant 
judgeship legislation, Congress and the judiciary should work together to 
expand the magistrate judge system in order to temporarily alleviate the 
current judicial capacity crisis.  
Part I of this essay highlights the ongoing judicial capacity crisis in 
U.S. district courts.  It begins with an overview of the Judicial 
Improvement Act of 1990, a substantive congressional reform that that 
still resonates today for both its institutional changes and its addition of 
Article III judgeships.  Fast-forwarding to present day, Part I proceeds to 
explain that the number of district court judgeships has not kept pace with 
growing populations and civil case loads.  And although Congress has 
recognized the strain this puts on the capacity of district courts, it has 
failed to reach the political consensus necessary to pass substantive 
judgeship legislation.  
Part II discusses the federal magistrate judge system.  It highlights its 
“commissioner” origins and its evolution, culminating with the 1968 
Federal Magistrate’s Act.  This Act established the modern magistrate 
judge system, an Article I judicial system working alongside Article III 
judges in district courts.  As case burdens have grown, magistrate 
judgeships have increased by the hundreds, and their responsibilities have 
evolved to handle nearly every aspect of district court litigation.  
Part III argues that while Congress fiddles with judgeship legislation, 
it also has the opportunity to substantially increase the magistrate judge 
system, allowing magistrate judges to take on much of the burden in 
district court civil litigation until Congress is able to pass substantive 
 
 1. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 928 (1991) (quoting Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Williams, 
892 F.2d 305, 308 (3d Cir. 1989)). 
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judgeship legislation.  Part III concludes by introducing and responding 
to potential critiques against such an expansion.  
II. THE JUDICIAL CAPACITY CRISIS  
A. More District Court Judgeships Are Needed 
The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 set the groundwork for how 
the federal courts would operate for the next thirty years.2  Title I—called 
the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA)—focused on ways to lessen 
costs and delays in civil litigation.3  The CJRA required federal district 
courts to create “reduction plans” that would identify ways to resolve civil 
cases more quickly.  For added accountability, the CJRA also required the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO) to prepare a 
semiannual report that identified any motions pending for more than six 
months and cases pending for more than three years.4  To this day, the AO 
continues to publish this semiannual report, which is now available 
online.5 
Titles III and IV of the Judicial Improvements Act offered other 
changes, including adjusting the retirement system for certain judges and 
modifying the rules surrounding the discipline and possible removal of 
judges.6  
Title II was the Act’s most influential reform.  Called the Federal 
Judgeship Act of 1990, this title created sixty-one new judgeships in 
district courts across the country.7  Although additional judgeships were 
set in every corner of the nation, particular emphasis was placed on 
“district courts in border and coastal States.”8  The reasoning was twofold: 
(1) case increases were most prevalent in these districts due to growing 
federal drug prosecutions, and (2) mandates such as the Speedy Trial Act, 
which set time limits to complete federal prosecutions, limited time for 
 
 2. See Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089. 
 3. 104 Stat. at 5090; 28 U.S.C. § 471. 
 4. 104 Stat. at 5093–94; 28 U.S.C. § 476. 
 5. See Civil Justice Reform Act Report, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-
reports/analysis-reports/civil-justice-reform-act-report (last visited May 12, 2020). 
 6. 104 Stat. at 5104–27. 
 7. 104 Stat. at 5098–5104. Specifically, the Act created sixty-one permanent and eight temporary-
to-permanent judgeships (totaling sixty-nine), thirteen temporary judgeships, and four roving-to-
permanent judgeships. See also ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZED 
JUDGESHIPS, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/districtauth.pdf  (last visited May 12, 2019).  
 8. Federal Judgeship Act of 1990: Hearing on H.R. 5316 Before the Subcomm. on Econ. and 
Commercial Law of H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 4 (1990) (statement of Rep. Jack Brooks, 
Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary).  
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judges to consider concurrent civil cases.9  
These reforms were much needed.  As summarized by one district 
judge, “[T]he burdens associated with the criminal caseload in some 
courts [were] rapidly reaching the point where judges [could] no longer 
devote any of their time to the civil docket.”10  In turn, these ongoing 
delays increased the costs of civil litigation.  When introducing the CJRA, 
then-Senator Joe Biden observed that “when cases cost so much and take 
so long that some people can’t use the courts at all and those who can use 
them find their pocketbooks depleted at record pace, we have a crisis of 
major dimensions.”11  
Three decades later, the federal courts again face a crisis of major 
dimensions.  Since 1990, the United States population has soared.  The 
number of civil filings has also exploded.  Case delays have again 
worsened, especially in many of the most populated states and districts.  
Yet the number of district court judgeships has remained largely stagnant 
for thirty years.  
The numbers are revealing.  In 1990, the United States population was 
just shy of 249 million.12  The population in 2020 is estimated to be just 
over 329 million, representing an increase of over 30%.13  Civil case 
filings have followed a similar trajectory.  In 1990, nearly 218,000 civil 
cases were filed in federal court.14  Last year, almost 298,000 civil cases 
were filed—an increase of approximately 36%.15  
As more cases are filed, more cases remain pending.  In 1990, over 
244,000 cases were pending in district court.16  By 2019, the number had 
risen to over 357,000—over a 46% increase.17  These escalating numbers 
of unresolved cases have led to growing case delays.  Of the 
approximately 357,000 cases pending through 2019, over 56,000—or 
15%—have been pending for three years or more.18  In 1990, only 10% 
 
 9. Id. at 4-5. 
 10. Id. at 18 (statement of Hon. Walter T. McGovern, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court, W. Dist. Wash.).  
 11. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990: Hearing on 
S. 2027 and S. 2648 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 6-7 (1990) (statement of Sen. 
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).  
 12. 1990 Census, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/main/www/cen1990.html (last 
visited May 12, 2020). 
 13. U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/popclock/ 
(last visited May 12, 2020).  
 14. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL 
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, TABLE 4.1 (2019), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jff_4.1_0930.2019.pdf.  
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. 
 17. Id.  
 18. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL 
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, TABLE 4.11 (2019),  
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of cases had been pending that long.19  
Yet in this nearly thirty-year period, the number of new district court 
judgeships has only marginally risen, especially relative to actual need 
and historical practice.  Since the 1990 Judicial Improvements Act, 
Congress has created only thirty-one district court judgeships.20  To 
compare, in the thirty years before to the 1990 legislation, Congress 
created over 270 judgeships.21  In the ten years before that, Congress had 
created another fifty-two judgeships.22 
Certain district courts have been disproportionately harmed by 
Congress’ failure to add new judgeships.  The district courts within the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals are a notable example.  The Ninth Circuit 
covers the western portion of the United States, encompassing nine states, 
two territories and fifteen federal district courts.23  It features some of the 
most sparsely populated states in the nation (e.g., Alaska and Montana) 
as well as the most populated state in the nation (California).  Since 1990, 
the population in California has grown by roughly 10 million.24  During 
the same time, the population of Alaska has grown by just over 187,000, 
and that of Montana has grown by just over 263,000.25  Alaska and 
Montana each have one district court, which covers each state, 
respectfully.26  California has four district courts covering different 
regions of the state.27  
 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jff_4.11_0930.2019.pdf (last visited May 12, 
2019). 
 19. Id. 
 20. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS (2019), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/allauth.pdf.  
 21. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS (2019), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/districtauth.pdf.  
 22. CARL BAAR, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDGESHIP CREATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: OPTIONS 
FOR REFORM 29 (1981).  
 23. What is the Ninth Circuit?, U.S. CTS. FOR THE NINTH CIR.,  
https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/judicial_council/what_is_the_ninth_circuit.php (last visited May 12, 20).  
 24. Compare Intercensal Estimates of the Total Resident Population of States: 1980 to 1990, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/popest/tables/1980-
1990/state/asrh/st8090ts.txt (a 1990 population estimate of about 30 million), with Annual Estimates of 
the Resident Population: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2018, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 4 (Mar. 2, 2020),  
https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/popest/tables/2010-2018/state/totals/PEPANNRES.pdf (a 
2018 population estimate of about 40 million). 
 25. Compare U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION GENERAL POPULATION 
CHARACTERISTICS, ALASKA 1 (1990) (1990 state population of 550,043), and U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS, MONTANA 1 (1990 state 
population of 799,065), with  Annual Estimates of the Resident Population: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2018, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 4 (Mar. 2, 2020),   https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/popest/tables/2010-
2018/state/totals/PEPANNRES.pdf (a 2018 population estimate of 737,438 for Alaska and 1,062,305 for 
Montana) (last visited May 12, 2020).  
 26. U.S. CTS. FOR THE NINTH CIR., supra note 23. 
 27. Id.  
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Given their marginal population increases, it is unsurprising to see that 
neither Alaska nor Montana have added a district judgeship since 1984.28  
The opposite, however, would be expected of California.  Since 1990, 
Congress has only added permanent judgeships in one of the four 
California district courts. In 2002, Congress added five judgeships in the 
Southern District of California, which covers only San Diego and 
Imperial counties.29  And despite California’s statewide population boom, 
neither the Northern District of California (based in San Francisco) nor 
the Central District of California (based in Los Angeles) have seen new 
permanent judgeships since 1990.30  The Eastern District of California 
(covering Sacramento, thirty-four counties and eight million residents) 
has had no new judgeships since 1978.31  
In reviewing caseload burdens on district courts, the Judicial 
Conference of the United States—the national policymaking body for the 
federal courts—applies a benchmark of 430 weighted filings per district 
judge.32  Today, many courts exceed this number, but the Eastern District 
of California is especially aberrant.  By the end of 2019, the Eastern 
District of California faced 745 weighted filings per judgeship, 73% more 
than the recommended amount.33  Because judges are simply not able to 
keep up with their caseloads, 13% of civil cases in the district are over 
three years old, and the median time from filing a civil case to trial is 
nearlytwo and a half years.34  
But the Eastern District of California is not alone.  Other district courts 
face similar, or even more burdensome, caseloads.  District courts in 
 
 28. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Chronological History of Authorized Judgeships - District 
Courts, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/authorized-judgeships/chronological-
history-authorized-judgeships-district-courts (last visited May 12, 2020). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id.  
 31. Id.; Hon. Lawrence J. O’Neill et al., An Important Letter to Congress from the Judges of the 
Eastern District of California Regarding Our Caseload Crisis, 1 (June 19, 2018), 
http://www.caed.uscourts.gov/caednew/assets/File/Judgeship%20Letter%20June%202018.pdf.  
 32. Examining the Need for New Federal Judges: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
115th Cong. 5 (2018) (written testimony of Hon. Roslynn Mauskopf et al.) [hereinafter Mauskopf et al.]. 
To note, weighted filings do not equate to the number of actual cases pending per district judge. Instead, 
“Weighted filings statistics account for the different amounts of time district judges require to resolve 
various types of civil and criminal actions.”  For instance, “Average civil cases or criminal defendants 
each receive a weight of approximately 1.0; for more time-consuming cases, higher weights are assessed 
(e.g., a death-penalty habeas corpus case is assigned a weight of 12.89); and cases demanding relatively 
little time from judges receive lower weights (e.g., an overpayment and recovery cost case involving a 
defaulted student loan is assigned a weight of 0.10).”  Explanation of Selected Terms, ADMIN. OFF. OF 
THE U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/explanation_of_selected_terms_december_ 
2019_0.pdf (last visited May 12, 2020).  
 33. Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, Comparison of Districts Within the Ninth Circuit — 12-Month 
Period Ending December 31, 2019, U.S. CTS. 9 (2019), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fcms_na_distcomparison1231.2019.pdf  
 34. Id.  
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Delaware, Indiana, Florida, and New Jersey see over one thousand 
weighted filings per judgeship.35  And district courts in Arizona, 
Louisiana, and Ohio see over seven hundred weighted filings per 
judgeship.36  
Even more troubling is that these numbers assume that these districts 
have no judicial vacancies.37  With districts that do, the case burdens are 
potentially even higher.  The number of vacancies has sharply increased 
in recent years. In 2014, there were 50 district court vacancies.38  By 2017, 
that number had risen to 120.39  Today, there still remain over seventy 
district court vacancies.40  Of these vacancies, there are only roughly forty 
nominees currently pending to fill these positions.41  What is more, 
several district judges are scheduled to take senior status this year or next, 
creating additional vacancies in the near future.42  Because of these 
growing caseloads and longstanding vacancies, the Judicial Conference 
has identified forty-six “judicial emergencies” across the country.43  
These determinations identify the most crushing vacancy numbers.44 
The old saying that “justice delayed is justice denied” has never been 
more relevant.  Indeed, longstanding vacancies and the sluggish growth 
in new judgeships creates real-world harm.  In civil litigation, each party 
typically pays its own litigation costs.  Case delays add to these costs, 
disproportionately hurting litigants with fewer resources.  Parties with 
more resources may even use this disadvantage as a litigation strategy.45   
 
 35. Id. at 3, 7, 11.  
 36. Id. at 6, 9, 11.  
 37. Mauskopf et al., supra note 32, at 4 (“The caseload standards used by the Judicial Conference 
are expressed as filings per authorized Article III judgeship, which assumes that all vacancies are filled.”). 
 38. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Status of Article III Judgeships - Judicial Business 2018, 
U.S. CTS. https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/status-article-iii-judgeships-judicial-business-2018 
(last visited May 12, 2020).  
 39. Id.  
 40. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Vacancies, U.S. CTS., 
https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies (last visited May 12, 2020).   
 41. Id. 
 42. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Future Judicial Vacancies, U.S. CTS., 
https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/future-judicial-vacancies (last visited 
May 12, 2020).  
 43. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Emergencies, U.S. CTS., 
https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/judicial-emergencies (last visited May 
12, 2020).  
 44. . Specifically, a “judicial emergency” is defined as “any vacancy where weighted filings are 
in excess of 600 per judgeship; OR any vacancy in existence more than 18 months where weighted filings 
are between 430 to 600 per judgeship; OR any vacancy where weighted filings exceed 800 per active 
judge; OR any court with more than one authorized judgeship and only one active judge.”  Admin. Office 
of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Emergency Definition, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-
judgeships/judicial-vacancies/judicial-emergencies/judicial-emergency-definition (last visited May 12, 
2020).  
 45. See, e.g., EVAN A. BLOCH & JEREMY A. MERCER, SETTLEMENT TACTICS IN US LITIGATION 1 
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A 2014 report by the Brennan Center identified other concerns.  For 
starters, judicial vacancies mean more than just absent judges—they also 
mean less administrative support in the courthouse.46  Less administrative 
support and growing caseloads add even more pressure on sitting judges 
to resolve cases even faster, which “raise[s] troubling concerns about the 
quality of justice dispensed.”47  Furthermore, there are growing worries 
of “judicial burn-out,” pushing judges inclined to stay on the bench to 
retire instead.48 
B. Congressional Reluctance 
Judges have not been silent about their concern and have called for 
congressional action.  For instance, in 2018, nine district judges from the 
Eastern District of California wrote an open letter to Congress “to provide 
notice of a current crisis” that will lead to “inaccessibility to the Federal 
Courts by the more than [eight] million people who reside within the 
Eastern District.”49  Prior to his retirement, one of the signers, District 
Judge Lawrence J. O’Neill, often included a “preliminary statement” in 
his written opinions: 
Judges in the Eastern District of California carry the heaviest caseloads in 
the nation, and this Court is unable to devote inordinate time and resources 
to individual cases and matters.   Given the shortage of district judges and 
staff, this Court addresses only the arguments, evidence, and matters 
necessary to reach the decision in this order.  The parties and counsel are 
encouraged to contact the offices of United States Senators [Dianne] 
Feinstein and [Kamala] Harris to address this Court’s inability to 
accommodate the parties and this action.50 
Of course, one immediate fix would be for the president to nominate 
more judges for current judicial vacancies and for the Senate the quickly 
confirm them.  But there are myriad political and pragmatic issues to 
consider.  For one, compared to circuit court or Supreme Court nominees, 
senators have significant influence on district court nominees in their 
 
(2010), http://www.klgates.com/files/tempFiles/c81c9da3-1d96-411e-86db- 
ccaa3dadaaf9/Bloch_Mercer_SettlementTactics.pdf (Suggesting that “[i]f . . . you represent a defendant 
with substantial resources and the plaintiff has limited resources, you may want to litigate and not settle.”). 
 46. ALICIA BANNON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL VACANCIES ON 
FEDERAL TRIAL COURTS 8–9 (2014), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Impact%20of%20Judicial%20Vacancies
%20072114.pdf.  
 47. Id. at 1.  
 48. Id.  
 49. O’Neill et al., supra note 31, at 1.  
 50. See, e.g., Thomas v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 1:18-cv-00211-LJO-BAM, 2018 WL 
2356758, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 24, 2018).  
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state.51  Therefore, the selection process often includes negotiations 
between Senate offices and the White House, which takes additional time.  
If this process breaks down, a home state senator can block a nomination 
in the Senate by withholding a blue slip.52  As a result, a home state 
senator enjoys numerous opportunities to recommend, stall, or even block 
a district court nomination.  
Nevertheless, even if all seats were expeditiously filled, it would not 
be enough to cure the current capacity crisis in many district courts.  The 
overwhelming caseload statistics highlighted previously assume that all 
vacancies are filled.   
The solution—advanced by judges, the Judicial Conference, and many 
members of Congress—is for Congress to add more district court 
judgeships via legislation.  Before his retirement, Judge O’Neill, for 
instance, publically pleaded for more judges for his California district 
court.53  In 2018 testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, 
members of the Judicial Conference recommended that Congress create 
dozens of new judgeships across the country.54  The Judicial Conference 
has since revised its request, asking for sixty-five new permanent 
judgeships in the most precarious districts.55  
For years, though, judgeship legislation has faltered in Congress.  
Several bills that would have created dozens of new judgeships have 
failed to pass both chambers.  For instance, a 1999 bill introduced by 
Senator Pat Leahy would have added forty-three judges.56  A 2000 bill 
introduced by former Senator Orrin Hatch would have added thirty-seven 
judgeships.57  Bills introduced in 2003, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011, 
and 2013 that would have added dozens of new judgeships also failed.58  
 
 51. DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34405, ROLE OF HOME STATE 
SENATORS IN THE SELECTION OF LOWER FEDERAL COURT JUDGES 2 (2013), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34405.pdf.  
 52. Under the current policy of the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, although the blue 
slip does not apply to circuit judge nominees, it still applies to district court nominees. Anthony Marcum, 
Understanding the Blue Slip Debate, R ST. POLICY SHORT NO. 68 (Mar. 2019), 
https://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Final-Short-No.-68.pdf. 
 53. McClatchy California Opinion Editors, Opinion, Memo to President Trump and Capitol Hill 
Leaders: The Central Valley Needs New Judges, FRESNO BEE (Mar. 1, 2019, 12:04 PM), 
https://www.fresnobee.com/opinion/editorials/article226944179.html.  
 54. Mauskopf et al., supra note 32, at 2.  
 55. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Additional Judgeships or Conversion of Existing Judgeships 
Recommended by the Judicial Conference, 2019, U.S. CTS., 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2019_judicial_conference_judgeship_recommendations_0.p
df (last visited May 12, 2020). 
 56. Federal Judgeship Act of 1999, S. 1145, 106th Cong. § 3 (2000). 
 57. Federal Judgeship Act of 2000, S. 3071, 106th Cong. § 3 (2000). 
 58. See, e.g., To create additional Federal court judgeships, S. 878, 108th Cong. § 1 (2003); Deficit 
Reduction Act of 2005, H.R. 4241, 109th Cong. § 5203(a) (2005); Federal Judgeship and Administrative 
Efficiency Act of 2005, H.R. 4093, 109th Cong. § 103(a) (2005); Immigration Enforcement and Border 
9
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In 2018, two bills were introduced, each proposing sixty new district court 
judgeships.59  Both bills, however, failed to advance past their respective 
committees. 
Many of these pitfalls can be attributed to party politics.  One of the 
two bills from the last Congress, for instance, would have divided the 
Ninth Circuit into two circuits, a move long supported by Republicans 
and opposed by Democrats.60  Such “poison pills” often stall otherwise 
bipartisan judgeship legislation.  There are also other realities to consider.  
New judgeships give a president the chance to nominate more judges.  
Naturally, politicians from one party are reluctant to give a president from 
the opposing party the opportunity to name more federal judges.  This 
amounts to a major obstacle to passing judgeship legislation.  
In the meantime, federal courts have employed creative stopgaps.  
Some have increased their focus on mediations and informal settlement 
conferences to resolve more cases before trial or lengthy motion 
practice.61  Many have relied on senior judges and visiting judges.  In 
2019, senior judges—federal judges that are eligible to retire but continue 
working, typically but not always at a reduced level—adjudicated 22% of 
all district court cases and 28% of all trials.62  Further, in 2019, visiting 
judges—federal judges from other courts authorized to take cases in other 
jurisdictions—were used to participate in thousands of appeals and 
criminal matters.63  But these stopgaps only go so far.  Indeed, the Judicial 
Conference considers all of these factors before requesting additional 
judgeships, and even with these considerations, it still advocates adding 
dozens of district court judgeships.  
This essay highlights the most effective stopgap so far: the federal 
magistrate judge system.  An expansion of this system in district courts 
would be an effective way to temporarily solve the judiciary’s capacity 
crises until longer-term judgeship legislation is in place.  
 
Security Act of 2007, S. 2294, 110th Cong. § 201(d)(1) (2007); Federal Judgeship and Administrative 
Efficiency Act of 2007, H.R. 3520, 110th Cong. § 103(a) (2007); Federal Judgeship Act of 2008, S. 2774, 
110th Cong. §3(a) (2008); Federal Judgeship Act of 2009, H.R. 3662, 111th Cong. § 3(a) (2009); Federal 
Judgeship Act of 2009, S. 1653, 111th Cong. § 3(a) (2009); Southwest Border Judgeship Expansion Act 
of 2011, H.R. 2365, 112th Cong. § 2(a) (2011); A bill to provide for additional Federal district judgeships, 
S. 1032, 112th Cong. § 1(a) (2011); Federal Judgeship Act of 2013, S. 1385, 113th, Cong. § 3(a) (2013). 
 59. Judicial Efficiency Improvement Act, S. 3259, 115th Cong. § 14(a) (2018); Judiciary ROOM 
Act of 2018, H.R. 6755, 115th Cong. § 101(a). 
 60. Judicial Efficiency Improvement Act, S. 3259, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018). 
 61. See, e.g., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Court Declares a Settlement Week to Clear Old 
Caseload, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2018/01/12/court-declares-settlement-week-clear-
old-caseload (last visited May 12, 2020).  
 62. Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, The Federal Bench – Annual Report 2018, U.S. CTS., 
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-bench-annual-report-2018 (last visited May 12, 2020).  
 63. Id. 
10
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss4/2
2020] MAGISTRATE JUDGES CAN IMPROVE JUDICIAL CAPACITY 1019 
III. THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE JUDGE SYSTEM 
A. Origins of the Federal Magistrate Judge System 
Ever since Congress has created judgeships, it has also empowered 
judicial officers to support them. Soon after the first Judiciary Act of 
1789—which established a six-member Supreme Court as well as lower 
circuit and district courts—“Congress gave circuit courts authority to 
appoint ‘discreet persons learned in the law’ to accept bail.”64  Over the 
next few decades, “Congress repeatedly expanded the power of these 
appointees . . . granting them powers including the ability to take 
affidavits and bail in civil cases, to take depositions in civil cases, to issue 
arrest warrants, and to hold persons for trial.”65  In 1896, Congress shifted 
these now-titled “United States commissioners” to the district courts and 
set four-year term limits, subject to earlier removal by the district court.66  
In 1968, Congress passed the Federal Magistrates Act (FMA), 
disposing of the commissioner role and laying the groundwork for the 
modern magistrate judge system.67  The FMA had dual purposes: “(1) to 
replace the outdated commissioner system with a cadre of new, upgraded 
federal judicial officers; and (2) to provide judicial relief to district judges 
in handling their caseloads.”68  The FMA set eight-year term limits for 
full-time magistrates and broadly expanded their authority to try “minor 
offenses” and any “additional duties . . . not inconsistent with the 
Constitution and laws of the United States.”69  In short, the FMA, which 
listed a non-exhaustive “number of tasks that magistrates could perform,” 
was largely a “grant[] of authority to serve as a guide and for district 
judges to experiment freely in delegating tasks to magistrates.”70 
The FMA gave magistrates, as Article I judicial officers, broad powers 
and allowed district courts substantial discretion in tasking them with a 
variety of judicial responsibilities.  But this system soon raised both legal 
and policy questions.  In 1974, the Supreme Court heard Wingo v. 
Wedding where the Court considered whether the FMA conflicted with a 
 
 64. Kelly Holt, Congressional Guidance on the Scope of Magistrate Judges' Duties, 84 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 909, 913 (2017).  
 65. Id. 
 66. Act of May 28, 1896, ch. 252, §§ 19–21, 29 Stat. 140, 184–85.  
 67. Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (1968).  
 68. PETER G. MCCABE, FED. BAR ASS’N, A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE JUDGES 
SYSTEM 5 (2016),  
https://www.fedbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/FBA-White-Paper-2016-pdf-2.pdf [hereinafter 
MCCABE, MAGISTRATE JUDGE GUIDE]. 
 69. Pub. L. No. 90-578, §§ 636, 3401, 82 Stat. 1107, 1113, 1115–16. 
 70. Brendan Linehan Shannon, The Federal Magistrates Act: A New Article III Analysis for A New 
Breed of Judicial Officer, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 253, 257 (1991).  
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separate habeas corpus statute that required a hearing before a federal 
judge.71  To resolve this and other legislative ambiguities, Congress 
amended the FMA two years later to “clarify the powers of magistrates to 
hear habeas corpus” actions and other matters.72  Soon after, Congress 
passed the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 to further expand and clarify 
magistrates’ duties in district court.73 
Recent legislation has recognized magistrates’ true judicial role in the 
federal courts.  In addition to creating dozens of new judgeships, the 
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 formally changed the title of “United 
States Magistrate” to “United States Magistrate Judge.”74  In 1996, 
appeals of magistrates’ final adjudications in civil consent cases were 
rerouted to go directly to circuit court.  And in 2000, magistrate judges 
gained contempt authority.75 
B. The Modern Magistrate Judge System 
While Congress determines the number of district court judgeships, the 
Judicial Conference determines the number of magistrate judgeships 
around the country.76  When making this determination, the Judicial 
Conference considers the “advice of district judges, the circuit councils, 
and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.”77  Nevertheless, the 
Judicial Conference’s determinations are ultimately “subject to 
congressional funding of the requested positions.”78  The AO’s 2021 
discretionary budget requested that Congress fund “two additional full-
time magistrate judges” and additional support staff, among other “critical 
new investments.”79  If approved, these additional judgeships will be 
placed in district courts selected by the Judicial Conference.  
Once Congress has provided funds for an additional magistrate 
judgeship and the Judicial Conference has selected where the judgeship 
should go, a regulated process begins to fill the new vacancy.  Through 
the FMA and subsequent revisions, Congress has set a baseline for who 
 
 71. Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 462-65 (1974).  
 72. Tim A. Baker, The Expanding Role of Magistrate Judges in the Federal Courts, 39 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 661, 665 (2005).  
 73. MCCABE, MAGISTRATE JUDGE GUIDE, supra note 68, at 11-13.  
 74. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 321, 104 Stat. 5089, 5117.  
 75. See MCCABE, MAGISTRATE JUDGE GUIDE, supra note 68, at 13 (summarizing more recent 
legislation).  
 76. Magistrate Judgeships, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/node/7501 (last visited May 12, 
2020).  
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. 
 79. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CTS., THE JUDICIARY FISCAL YEAR 2020 CONGRESSIONAL 
BUDGET SUMMARY 4 (2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fy_2021_congressional_ 
budget_summary_0.pdf.  
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may be a magistrate judge, established guidelines on how magistrate 
judges are chosen, and specified their broad role in district courts. 
Unlike lay magistrates who serve in many state courts around the 
country, or even Article III judges nominated by the president, federal 
magistrate judges must be lawyers and members of a bar for a least five 
years.80  Of course, nearly all magistrate judges far exceed this minimum 
standard.  Indeed, last year, new magistrate judges “had been members of 
the bar for an average of 22 years at the time of their appointments” and 
had held an array of legal experiences.81 
The high quality of magistrate judges is ensured largely due to how 
they are selected.  Compared to the nomination and confirmation of 
Article III judges, the selection of magistrate judges is both a regulated 
and apolitical process.  Regulations require that magistrate judge 
vacancies be publicly posted “as widely as practicable so that all qualified 
members of the bar are aware of the opportunity to apply for the 
position.”82 
From there, the district judges of the relevant court establish a merit 
selection panel that considers magistrate judge applications.83  Each 
member of the panel “must either be a resident of the district, or, if a 
nonresident, have significant ties to the community.”84  To avoid conflicts 
of interest, the panel cannot include federal judges or court employees.85  
Each panel member is also obligated to disclose “any personal or 
professional relationship” she may have with an applicant.86  To 
emphasize the community’s interest in the selection, it is further required 
that at least two non-lawyers sit on the panel.87 
The panel enjoys some discretion in reviewing applicants.  It may 
conduct personal interviews and consider a range of characteristics, 
including an applicant’s legal scholarship, length and type of practice, 
 
 80. Compare Lars Trautman & SteVon Felton, The Use of Lay Magistrates in the United States, 
R ST. POLICY STUDY NO. 173 (May 2019), https://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Final-
No.-173.pdf (surveying states’ use of lay magistrates in local courts), and About the Court, Frequently 
Asked Questions, SUPREME CT. OF THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/faq_general.aspx 
(“The Constitution does not specify qualifications for Justices such as age, education, profession, or 
native-born citizenship.”), with 28 U.S.C. § 631(b) (1948) (requiring full-time magistrate judges to have 
“been for at least five years a member in good standing of” a bar).  
 81. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts,  Status of Magistrate Judge Positions and Appointments – 
Judicial Business 2019, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/status-magistrate-judge-positions-and-
appointments-judicial-business-2019 (last visited May 12, 2020).  
 82. MAGISTRATE JUDGES DIV., ADMIN OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, THE SELECTION, 
APPOINTMENT, AND REAPPOINTMENT OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGES 14 (2010), 
http://www.nced.uscourts.gov/pdfs/Selection-Appointment-Reappointment-of-Magistrate-Judges.pdf.    
 83. Id. at 17.  
 84. Id.  
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. at 21.  
 87. Id. at 17.  
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knowledge of the court system, and personal character.88  Diversity is also 
considered, as the panel is encouraged to “give due consideration to all 
qualified applicants . . . particularly those from underrepresented 
groups.”89  Above all, the panel is expected to “recommend individuals 
who possess the same types of personal and professional qualities 
expected of district judges.”90 
Within ninety days, the panel submits a report to the district court 
identifying the five most qualified applicants.91  From those five names, 
the district judges of the court may conduct their own interviews and will 
ultimately select a new magistrate judge by majority vote.92  The selected 
applicant then undergoes a full Federal Bureau of Investigation and 
Internal Revenue Service investigation93  After completing these 
investigations and taking both judicial and constitutional oaths, a 
magistrate judge begins their service.94  
Once on the bench, the tenure and benefits of magistrate judges differs 
from those of Article III judges in several important respects.  First, while 
Article III judges serve “for good behavior,” full-time magistrate judges 
serve for eight-year terms.  During this time, magistrate judges earn 92% 
of the salary of district judges.95  And while Article III judges may only 
be removed through impeachment by Congress, magistrate judges may be 
removed during their term by a majority of judges in the relevant district 
for “incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental 
disability.”96  Alternatively, a magistrate judge’s position may 
“terminated if the [Judicial Conference] determines that the services 
performed by [the magistrate judge] are no longer needed.”97 
There are, however, some notable similarities.  Like the salaries of 
Article III judges, magistrate judges’ salaries may not be reduced during 
their term.98  Also, like Article III judges, magistrate judges may attend 
training programs and seminars, and they receive funding for law clerks, 
office and courtroom space, and administrative staff.99  And although 
 
 88. Id. at 25–28.  
 89. Id. at 28.  
 90. Id. at 26.  
 91. Id. at 29–30.  
 92. Id. at 31–33.  
 93. Id. at 32.  
 94. Id. at 39–40.  
 95. 28 U.S.C. § 634(a) (1948).  
 96. 28 U.S.C. § 631(i) (1948). 
 97. Id.  
 98. 28 U.S.C. § 634(b) (1948). Of course, while magistrate judges’ salaries are protected by 
statute, Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution protects Article III judges’ salaries.  
 99. 28 U.S.C. § 635(a) (1948). Often within the first year of service, magistrate judges attend 
“baby judges school,” which provides instruction on many of the issues and responsibilities magistrate 
judges encounter in their work. See 28 U.S.C. § 637 (1946); Spike Gillespie, A Dream Made Real, U. 
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magistrate judges do not enjoy life tenure, they may be reappointed to 
multiple eight-year terms, potentially serving for decades.100  Finally, 
magistrate judges who complete at least one term are eligible to receive 
retirement benefits.101  
The modern magistrate judge system, as succinctly summarized by one 
Midwestern magistrate judge, is to be “deliberately flexible so that each 
district could structure the Magistrate’s role to best suit its needs.”102  This 
flexibility allows magistrate judges to be “the utility ball player of the 
court system.”103  
This flexibility is most evident in the district court’s civil docket.104  
Most, if not all, magistrate judges are heavily involved in the early pretrial 
stages of a civil case.  As a result, many magistrate judges “have become 
experts in civil case management, discovery and settlement.”105  These 
skills have become increasingly useful for district courts.  
For instance, it has been shown that earlier “planning and management 
of litigation” by judges helps to “accelerate[] the processing and 
termination of cases.”106  As a result, magistrate judges are often tasked 
with setting early litigation benchmarks, including discovery and motion 
deadlines and trial dates.107 
If a discovery dispute arises, some magistrate judges will meet with 
parties to determine if the issue can be resolved informally.108  If motions 
to compel are filed, district judges will often have a magistrate judge 
 
TEX. AT AUSTIN SCH. OF LAW (Feb. 16, 2010), https://law.utexas.edu/news/2010/02/16/a-dream-made-
real/. 
 100. This is common practice.  Indeed, as observed by the AO, “[A]n incumbent magistrate judge 
who has performed well in the position should be reappointed to another term of office.” MAGISTRATE 
JUDGES DIV., ADMIN OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, supra note 82, at 37. During their terms, magistrate judges 
undergo performance reviews, and the district court is not obligated to reappoint them. And even if the 
court decides to consider another eight-year term for an incumbent magistrate judge, it must nevertheless 
provide public notice in order to receive comments from the public and the bar. Id. at 37–40. 
 101. 28 U.S.C. § 377(a)-(b) (1988).  
 102. Hon. Aaron E. Goodstein, The Expanding Role of Magistrate Judges: One District’s 
Experience, THE FED. LAWYER 69 (2014), http://www.fedbar.org/Resources_1/Federal-Lawyer-
Magazine/2014/MayJune/Features/The-Expanding-Role-of-Magistrate-Judges-One-Districts-
Experience.aspx?FT=.pdf.  
 103. Id.  
 104. To note, magistrate judges are substantially involved with criminal cases as well.  For example, 
they often authorize arrest warrants and search warrants; hold initial appearances, detention hearings, and 
arraignments; and try all misdemeanor cases. MCCABE, MAGISTRATE JUDGE GUIDE, supra note 68, at 
22–39. This essay, though, focuses how magistrate judges may primarily alleviate district courts’ civil 
caseloads.  
 105. Id. at 41.  
 106. FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s notes to 1983 amendment.  
 107. MCCABE, MAGISTRATE JUDGE GUIDE, supra note 68, at 42.  
 108. See e.g., Hon. Gordon P. Gallagher, Discovery Dispute Procedures, U.S. DIST. COURT, DIST. 
OF COLO. (Mar. 1, 2017), http://www.cod.uscourts.gov/Portals/0/Documents/Judges/MAG/Discovery_ 
Dispute_Procedures.pdf (detailing one magistrate judge’s discovery dispute policy).  
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rule.109  As a result, because “a party’s success in today’s federal court 
litigation arena often rises or falls at the discovery stage . . . magistrate 
judges traditionally enjoy substantial control and influence” over civil 
cases.110  
After the discovery period, few civil cases—around 1%—go to trial in 
district court.111  This is often the result of out-of-court settlement where, 
again, magistrate judges play an important role.  In many districts, 
magistrate judges oversee settlement conferences, conduct mediations, or 
even manage courts’ alternative dispute resolution programs.112 
Magistrate judges also frequently handle the entirety of Social Security 
appeals113 and prisoner cases.114  They do so for three simple reasons: 
“because of the large number of them filed in many courts, the time that 
referral saves for district judges, and the expertise that magistrate judges 
have developed in the[se] specialized areas of the law.”115  Both types of 
cases constitute a significant portion of district courts’ civil docket.  Last 
year, for example, over 55,000 prisoner petitions and 17,000 Social 
Security appeals were filed in district court.116 
In these types of cases and others, motions are often filed, and district 
judges may task magistrate judges to resolve them.  Motions in these 
instances fall under two categories: dispositive and non-dispositive 
motions.  Dispositive motions are typically motions that could end a case 
or claim. Such motions include motions for summary judgement and 
 
 109. Goodstein, supra note 102, at 69  (“In some districts where the criminal load was substantial, 
Magistrates had very limited civil duties; but, in others, they were assigned all of the civil discovery 
disputes, together with additional pretrial case management.”). 
 110. Baker, supra note 72, at 676.  Moreover, objections to magistrate judges’ discovery orders are 
often futile.  In interviews, some “districts [have] expressed the view that they considered it important to 
‘back up’ the magistrate judge when objections were taken to a magistrate judge’s discovery rulings.”  
Hon. Philip M. Pro, United States Magistrate Judges: Present but Unaccounted For, 16 NEV. L.J. 783, 
802 (2016).  
 111. Jeffrey Q. Smith & Grant R. MacQueen, Going, Going, But Not Quite Gone: Trials Continue 
to Decline in Federal and State Courts, 101 Judicature 26, 28 (2017). 
 112. Pro, supra note 110, at 790; MCCABE, MAGISTRATE JUDGE GUIDE, supra note 68, at 44–45.  
 113. “Unlike the vast majority of federal district court cases, [Social Security Administration 
Disability] cases are appeals. The claimant seeking disability benefits under federal law has sought relief 
in a multi-tiered adjudication process within the Social Security Administration. After being denied 
benefits by an agency administrative law judge and the Appeals Council (the SSA’s appellate body), a 
claimant may appeal that denial to their local federal district court.”  Tracey E. George et al., From Wall 
Street to Main Street: A Multidimensional Map of the Impact of Magistrate Judges on Federal Courts 24 
(Vand. Law Res., Working Paper No. 18-57, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3262302.  
 114. “There are three principal categories of prisoner cases: (1) state habeas corpus proceedings; 
(2) federal habeas corpus proceedings; and (3) petitions challenging conditions of confinement.”  
MCCABE, MAGISTRATE JUDGE GUIDE, supra note 68, at 51.  
 115. Id. at 49–50.  
 116. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Table 4.4: U.S. District courts—Civil Cases Filed, by Nature 
of Suit, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jff_4.4_0930.2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NLX9-FNS5].  
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motions to dismiss a claim or class action.117  When reviewing dispositive 
motions, magistrate judges may conduct hearings, hear testimony, and 
submit a report and recommendation (R&R) to the court that contains 
proposed findings of fact and a recommended disposition.118  Parties may 
object to any aspect of the R&R.119  A district judge will review any 
objection to the R&R de novo and “may accept, reject, or modify, in 
whole or in part” the R&R or “recommit the matter to the magistrate judge 
with instructions.”120 
When non-dispositive motions are referred to a magistrate judge, the 
magistrate judge conducts “required proceedings” but will afterward 
submit an order instead of an R&R.121  Parties may also appeal orders to 
a district judge, but the standard of review is much higher than the 
standard used for objections to R&Rs for dispositive motions.  Instead of 
reviewing the objections de novo, the district judge may only modify the 
magistrate judge’s order if it “is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.”122 
In addition to resolving piecemeal matters in civil cases, magistrate 
judges may assume the identical duties of a district judge.  Indeed, “if all 
parties consent,” magistrate judges in civil cases may rule on dispositive 
motions and oversee jury and bench trials.123  In these cases, appeals do 
not go to the district judges but instead proceed directly to the above 
circuit court.124 
C. Magistrate Judges’ Wide-Ranging Impact 
The federal magistrate judge system is a wide-ranging and invaluable 
system for federal district courts.  Supreme Court justices, fellow judges, 
and many court scholars have all recognized its contribution.  
One year after the Judicial Improvements Act passed, Justice John Paul 
Stevens noted that, “Given the bloated dockets that district courts have 
now come to expect as ordinary, the role of the magistrate in today's 
federal judicial system is nothing less than indispensable.”125  Years later, 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor similarly remarked that it was “no exaggeration 
to say that without the distinguished service of these judicial colleagues, 
 
 117. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1948). 
 118. § 636(b)(1)(C). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). 
 119. § 636(b)(1)(C). 
 120. Id.  
 121. FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a). 
 122. § 636(b)(1)(A). 
 123. § 636(c). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 73(a).  
 124. § 636(c)(3). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 73(c).  
 125. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 928 (1991) (emphasis added) (quoting Virgin Islands v. 
Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 308 (3d Cir. 1989)). 
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the work of the federal court system would grind nearly to a halt.”126  
Retired federal district judge (and former magistrate judge) Philip Pro 
also observed “that the interrelationship between United States district 
and magistrate judges is inescapable, and profoundly important to the 
resolution of most cases litigated in United States district court.”127  A 
recent research paper also concluded “that all districts courts rely upon 
magistrate judges and grant them real power.”128 
The facts support these observations.  As summarized previously, there 
are currently 667 authorized district judgeships, not much more than the 
632 judgeships authorized after the 1990 Judicial Improvements Act 
passed.  While the push for additional district judgeships has stagnated in 
recent years, the number of full-time magistrate judges has soared.  In 
1971, there were only sixty-one full-time magistrate judges serving in 
district courts nationwide.  By 1990, there were 300 full-time magistrate 
judges and only 162 part-time magistrate judges.  Ten years later, 500 
full-time magistrate judges were in service.129  Today, there are 549 
authorized magistrate judges and only twenty-nine part-time magistrate 
judges.130  
As caseloads continue to increase, magistrate judges have picked up 
much of the slack.  Information provided by the U.S. Courts during the 
2019 fiscal year details the thousands of civil matters magistrate judges 
resolve annually.131  In 2019 alone, magistrate judges disposed of 226,808 
non-dispositive motions; issued R&Rs in 4,410 Social Security appeals, 
25,414 in prisoner litigation, and 16,200 on other dispositive motions; 
held 19,290 settlement conferences and 54,192 pretrial conferences; 
oversaw 1,065 evidentiary hearings and 9,864 motions hearings; and fully 
presided over 17,817 civil cases, including 186 jury trials and 98 nonjury 
trials.132  
Of these tens of thousands of matters, two categories stand out most 
for their vast increases in numbers over the last ten years: civil dispositive 
motions (a 40% increase) and full civil consent cases (a 42% increase).  
 
 126. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1938–39 (2015). 
 127. Pro, supra note 110, at 821.   
 128. George et al., supra note 113, at 6. 
 129. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Just the Facts: Magistrate Judges Reach the Half Century 
Mark, U.S. CTS. (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2019/02/20/just-facts-magistrate-
judges-reach-half-century-mark.   
 130. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Status of Magistrate Judge Positions and Appointments – 
Judicial Business 2019, https://www.uscourts.gov/status-magistrate-judge-positions-and-appointments-
judicial-business-2019 (last visited May 12, 2020). 
 131. Admin Office of the U.S. Courts, Matters Disposed of by U.S. Magistrate Judges For the 10 - 
Year Period Ended September 30, 2019, U.S. CTS., 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_s17_0930.2019.pdf  (last visited May 12, 
2020).  
 132. Id.  
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A recent paper written by two authors who have worked at the AO offers 
potential reasons for the increase of R&Rs for dispositive motions:   
Some courts view [R&Rs] as a “necessary evil” for practical and equitable 
division of the court’s judicial workload among the court’s judges, often in 
the context of a heavy overall caseload. Many district judges find referrals 
of certain case-dispositive motions, especially if they are to require 
evidentiary hearings (e.g., motions to suppress evidence in felony cases), 
as extremely valuable time-savers . . . . Finally, courts report that, typically, 
objections are not filed to reports and recommendations issued in particular 
types of cases, such as social security appeals, in which case the delay in 
adjudication of the motion is shortened to some degree.133 
Other reasons support the expansion of civil consent cases.  To 
alleviate case burdens, some district courts place magistrate judges on the 
case “wheel,” meaning magistrate judges are assigned full civil cases with 
the same regularity as district judges.134  Of course, litigants may refuse 
to consent to these random assignments, but most consent.  
The reasons for consent are plenty.  Magistrate judges are highly 
qualified, familiar with the federal court system, and typically have more 
trial availability than district judges.  Magistrate judges are also likely to 
have more trial dates available due to having no felony criminal trial 
docket.135  Moreover, consenting to a magistrate judge taking over an 
entire civil case avoids other delays.  For example, it avoids the duplicity 
of a district judge referring a motion to a magistrate judge for an R&R 
and then the delay of potential objections to that R&R being sent back to 
the district judge.  Full consent would save any dispositive appeals for the 
circuit court. Lastly, a magistrate judge is already likely to be familiar 
with a case’s facts if that magistrate judge was previously tasked with 
conducting case management conferences and resolving discovery 
disputes, meaning less time is needed for the them to become familiar 
with the nuanced facts of the case.136  
In short, Magistrate judges allow for fewer case delays for civil 
litigants.  It is no wonder that Department of Justice regulations 
 
 133. Douglas A. Lee & Thomas E. Davis, “Nothing less than Indispensable”: The Expansion of 
Federal Magistrate Judge Authority and Utilization in the Past Quarter Century, 16 NEV. L.J. 845, 945 
(2016).  
 134. Hon. Morton Denlow, Should You Consent to the Magistrate Judge? Absolutely, and Here’s 
Why, 37 LITIG. 3 (2011). 
 135. See, e.g., Thomas v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 1:18-cv-00211-LJO-BAM, 2018 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 88072, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May. 24, 2018) (ordering litigants to “reconsider consent to conduct 
all further proceedings before a Magistrate Judge, whose schedules are far more realistic and 
accommodating to parties than that of [the district judge] who must prioritize criminal and older civil 
cases.”). 
 136. Denlow, supra note 134, at 66.  
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“encourage the use of magistrate judges” in district court litigation.137 
IV. HOW AN INCREASE IN  MAGISTRATE JUDGES HELPS 
The political process has failed the federal courts.  As caseloads and 
delays have risen, Congress has failed to enact long-term legislation to 
add new judgeships and help alleviate the burden on federal courts.  Yet 
while Congress has remained static, the federal courts have been active in 
finding creative ways to manage the judicial capacity crisis.  The most 
effective avenue has been the growth of the magistrate judge system.  An 
even greater expansion of this program would serve as an effective short-
term solution for federal district courts—at least until Congress is able to 
deliver long-term reform.  
A. The Advantages of Magistrate Judges 
The advantages of growing the magistrate judge system are numerous.  
The most obvious is that additional magistrate judges in the most 
overburdened district courts would help alleviate caseloads, fast-track 
civil trials, and decrease the cost and stress of perpetually delayed 
litigation.  In consent cases, magistrate judges can handle entire civil 
cases.  In other situations, magistrate judges can shorten litigation times 
by being active in case management, resolving non-dispositive motions, 
and even helping parties settle their disputes before trial.  
But adding more magistrate judges is not simply a numbers game.  Due 
to geography, population, economy, resources, and many other factors, 
every district court is unique in its challenges and emphases.   The distinct 
statutory role of magistrate judges allows district courts the needed 
flexibility to task magistrate judges with broad, narrow, or even evolving 
responsibilities.  
While district judges are generalists encountering a “remarkable 
diversity of cases,”138 magistrate judges have the opportunity to specialize 
and assist courts on specific or especially complex topics.  Magistrate 
judges already versed in the growing and complex world of “eDiscovery,” 
for instance, may be instrumental in resolving discovery disputes before 
a litany of motions and drawn-out evidentiary hearings.  In one example, 
before joining Facebook, Paul Grewal was a magistrate judge in the 
Northern District of California.139  Prior to joining the bench, Grewal was 
 
 137. 28 C.F.R. § 52.01(b) (1980).  
 138. Hon. Diane P. Wood, Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, 50 SMU L. Rev. 1755 (1997).  
 139. Ina Fried, U.S. Magistrate Judge Paul Grewal is leaving the bench for Facebook, VOX (May 
12, 2016, 8:43 PM), https://www.vox.com/2016/5/12/11668896/federal-magistrate-paul-grewal-joining-
facebook.  
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an intellectual property litigator, representing inventors and technology 
firms.  In the district home to Silicon Valley, the expertise Grewal gained 
from private practice certainly helped him resolve complex district court 
cases centered on these topics.140  
Many district courts have enacted policies promoting specialization, 
especially for prisoner cases and Social Security appeals.141  In 2001, the 
Eastern District of New York “appointed a new, additional magistrate 
judge with a specific mandate: to oversee the court’s pro se docket.”142  
The court reasoned that this program “could direct greater attention to 
those pro se cases involving potentially meritorious claims.”143  A 2014 
“standing order” from the Eastern District of Virginia states that “if all 
parties in a Social Security Appeal consent,” the case will be assigned to 
a magistrate judge “for all purposes.”144  Many other districts follow 
similar practices.145  
Yet despite magistrate judges’ large influence, their congressional-
based authorities do not trample on the judiciary’s toes.  As discussed 
above, the district court enjoys a variety of tools to use as checks ensuring 
that magistrate judges’ powers do not exceed the authority of judges who 
were confirmed by the Senate.  The first of these checks is how magistrate 
judges are selected.  Although recommended by a merit selection panel, 
a magistrate judge is ultimately chosen by the Article III judges for whom 
they will work.  The second is the process of referring matters in federal 
court.  Unless all parties consent to proceed before a magistrate judge, a 
district judge will have the opportunity to accept or reject R&Rs and can 
exercise discretion over whether to delegate matters to a magistrate judge.  
The third is district judges’ power to remove a magistrate judge for cause 
as well as the choice not to reappoint a magistrate judge once their eight-
year term is complete.  The final check is proximity.  Indeed, “District 
judges interact with magistrate judges in the courthouse and thus can rely 
on the many informal tactics used in every workplace by supervisors over 
 
 140. Id.   
 141. Pure specialization, though, is somewhat controversial.  Both the Judicial Conference and the 
Magistrate Judges Committee have disfavored pure specialization.  Some districts have “reconciled” this 
issue “by using magistrate judges in both roles, that is, as specialists for certain narrow types of cases 
(e.g., state habeas corpus cases) but also as generalists in a range of other types of cases.”  Lee & Davis, 
supra note 133, at 947.  
 142. Lois Bloom, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE DAME 
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 475, 495 (2002).  
 143. Id. at 495–96.  
 144. Hon. James R. Spencer, Standing Order, U.S. DIST. CT., E. DIST. VA. (June 21, 2014), 
http://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/localrules/StandingOrderConsentmagistrate.pdf. The magistrate judge 
identified to receive these cases, Judge David J. Novak, was confirmed to be a district judge in the same 
district in October 2019.  
 145. See George et al., supra note 113, at 26–32 (detailing “common patterns in how [magistrate 
judges] are used by district courts to process [Social Security Administration] cases.”). 
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their direct reports.”146 
Perhaps most importantly, the growth of the magistrate judge system 
sidesteps the largest barrier to long-term judicial reform: the politics of 
judicial confirmations.  The constitutional origins of both district judges 
(Article III) and magistrate judges (Article I) lay the groundwork for this 
advantage.  District judges are nominated by the president and confirmed 
by the Senate. As a result, presidents and senators have an interest in 
selecting judges “who satisfy their supporters, their political party, and 
the attentive public.”147  This process, as summarized by one district judge 
who experienced it firsthand, can become “highly partisan.”148  
The calculus changes when choosing a magistrate judge.  After careful 
vetting by a merit selection panel, district judges—not politicians—
choose who will be their colleague.  This alone incentivizes Article III 
judges “to pick stellar candidates.”149  Indeed, although “[d]istrict judges 
undoubtedly care to some extent about the magistrate judges’ ideological 
position on those topics most relevant to district court work . . . the most 
pressing consideration for district judges is their personal concerns about 
getting their work done.”150  These considerations allow district judges to 
select a magistrate judge “more truly based on merit.”151 
Expansion of the magistrate judge system should gain bipartisan 
support.  Year after year, members of Congress, citing growing caseloads, 
have publicly supported increasing judgeships.  However, their 
enthusiasm often wanes when the president is a member of the opposite 
party.  The reason is simple: “New judgeships create new vacancies, and 
neither party wants to give the other the opportunity to fill them.”152  
Expanding the magistrate judge system alleviates this problem.  Neither 
the President nor the Senate will have to consider additional nominations.  
Magistrate judges are term-limited and have no authorities to defy the 
Article III judges that the Senate did confirm.  Most importantly, the 
expansion of the system provides some relief to overburdened district 
courts while they wait on Congress to pass substantive judgeship 
legislation.  
As mentioned before, it is not enough simply to fill all current 
vacancies.  Some of the most desperate district courts have few, or none 
at all.   Furthermore, the political scramble to fill vacant seats may 
 
 146. Id. at 9.  
 147. Id. 
 148. Pro, supra note 111, at 817.   
 149. Judith Resnik, “Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice”: Inventing the Federal District Courts of 
the Twentieth Century for the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO L. J. 607, 671 (2002).  
 150. George et al., supra note 113, at 9.  
 151. Pro, supra note 110, at 817.  
 152. Cara Bayles, “In a Timely Manner”: Three Decades of Judgeship Bills, LAW360 (Mar. 19, 
2019, 9:17 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1140612.  
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generate unintentional political aftershocks, which may further delay 
successful judgeship legislation.  Undoubtedly, President Trump and the 
Senate have been wildly successful in nominating and confirming many 
judicial nominees in recent years.153  But this success is largely premised 
on one party controlling both the presidency and the Senate.  History tells 
us that this advantage cannot last. And when the inevitable occurs—in 
which one party occupies the White House and the other controls the 
Senate—the growing partisan ill-will surrounding confirmations could 
hurt the prospect of passing good judgeship legislation or even postpone 
the filling of future vacancies.  The more prudent approach, therefore, is 
to use magistrate judges as a Band-Aid while the politically fraught 
judicial confirmation process has time to heal.  
B. Possible Implementation 
Any expansion of the magistrate judge system is reliant on Congress 
for appropriation of funds.  Although the federal budget process is often 
victim to political impasse, the judiciary is rarely a source of dispute.  
Indeed, as the federal judiciary accounts for only 0.2% of the entire 
federal budget, there is not much to scrutinize.  Moreover, compared to 
the arguably bloated budgets of other agencies and initiatives, the 
judiciary has made great efforts in recent years to reduce spending—
including, for example, saving approximately $36 million a year by 
reducing rent space.154  
Congressional appropriators have noticed.  In a recent House 
Appropriations Committee report, Congress praised “the Judiciary’s cost 
containment efforts over the past 12 years.”155  Appropriators have also 
recognized the most pressing problem facing the federal courts, stating 
their concern “that, absent executive and congressional action to fill 
existing judicial vacancies and the passage of comprehensive bipartisan 
legislation to create new judgeships, the ability of the federal courts to 
administer justice in a swift, fair, and effective manner could be 
 
 153. See Judicial Appointment Tracker, HERITAGE FOUND., 
https://www.heritage.org/judicialtracker (last visited May 12, 2020) (providing “current data on six 
components of the process: judicial vacancies, nominations, hearings, confirmations, votes to end debate, 
and roll call votes.”).   
 154. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CTS., THE JUDICIARY FISCAL YEAR 2021 CONGRESSIONAL 
BUDGET SUMMARY iii (2020), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fy_2021_congressional_budget_summary_0.pdf. 
 155. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON APPROP., 116TH CONG., REP. ON FINANCIAL SERVICES AND GENERAL 
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compromised.”156 
The federal courts should use Congressional appropriators’ fears to 
their advantage.  If appropriators are worried about the need for new 
judgeships (and are willing to fund them), it follows that they may be 
willing to fund an increase of the magistrate judge system.  This measure 
would temporarily help the federal courts “administer justice in a swift, 
fair, and effective manner.”  
Appropriators should not be concerned about funding duplicative 
judicial capacity efforts.  If Congress were later to pass legislation adding 
district judgeships, the Judicial Conference has statutory discretion to 
terminate a magistrate judgeship “if the conference determines that the 
services performed . . . are no longer needed.”157  Therefore, the number 
of magistrate judgeships can be reduced as more district judges begin 
service.  
The Judicial Conference has requested funds for additional magistrate 
judgeships before.  Its past requests have been comparatively modest.  For 
fiscal years 2020 and 2021, for instance, the Judicial Conference 
requested $7.3 million for eight new magistrate judgeships and associated 
support staff and operating costs.158  Of course, a significant expansion of 
the program would be more expensive.  Using the simple (and generously 
approximate) million-dollars-per-judgeship formula, if the Judicial 
Conference were to request the same number of new magistrate judges as 
it has new district judgeships,159 the initial request would just exceed $70 
million, a minimal increase of the judiciary’s current $7.5 billion annual 
appropriation.160 
Nevertheless, any increase in federal spending merits close review, and 
Congress would likely look to ways to offset the cost of expanding the 
magistrate judge system.  A modest increase in civil filing fees could 
provide a significant offset as well as a reroute of some of the federal 
courts’ discretionary funding.  As one example, the fees the judiciary 
collects from access to its electronic records system totals approximately 
$145 million annually, even though its actual operating costs are much 
less.161  But even if no creative offset were available, an increase of the 
 
 156. Id. at 40.  
 157. 28 U.S.C. § 631(i) (1948).  
 158. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CTS., supra note 154, at 8. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CTS., THE 
JUDICIARY FISCAL YEAR 2020 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET SUMMARY 16 (2019), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fy_2020_congressional_budget_summary_0.pdf 
 159. As noted supra, the Judiciary Conference recently recommended sixty-five permanent and 
eight temporary district court judgeships. Admin Office of the U.S. Courts, supra note 55.    
 160. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CTS., supra note 154, at i. 
 161. See Adam Liptak, Attacking a Pay Wall That Hides Public Court Filings, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/04/us/politics/pacer-fees-lawsuit.html (“By one estimate, the 
actual cost of retrieving court documents, including secure storage, is about one half of one ten-thousandth 
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magistrate judge system remains a worthy investment.  
C. Potential Critiques 
A significant expansion of the magistrate judge system would likely 
generate some objection.  Most of the critiques would probably focus on 
magistrate judges’ powers and qualifications.  
The Judicial Conference itself has raised one likely argument.  In June 
2018, three district court judges and members of the Judicial Conference’s 
Judicial Resources Committee testified before a House Judiciary 
Subcommittee on the need for new federal judgeships.  Their testimony 
provided reasons why additional judgeships are necessary but argued that 
“[t]he problem cannot be addressed just by adding magistrate judges, or 
hoping senior and visiting judges will lessen the workload and reduce the 
need for more judgeships.162  Magistrate judges are insufficient, they 
reasoned, because their “jurisdiction is limited.”163 
Yet the advantage of the magistrate judge system is not its jurisdiction, 
but its flexibility.  Although magistrate judges cannot oversee criminal 
felony trials, by consent or referral, they may be involved in nearly every 
other aspect of district court litigation.  And criminal trials in federal court 
are rare.  In fact, “Nearly 80,000 people were defendants in federal 
criminal cases in fiscal 2018, but just 2% of them went to trial.”164  As 
such, a magistrate judge’s jurisdictional limitations are not as stark—or 
as problematic—as the Judicial Conference may suggest.  
Furthermore, the flexibility of the magistrate judge system gives 
district courts the discretion to use magistrate judges in any way they see 
fit.  This makes magistrate judges more beneficial than either senior 
judges or visiting judges.  A senior judge is an Article III judge who has 
taken senior status.165   Yet unlike a regular district judge, senior judges 
are not obligated to take a full caseload or work throughout the entire 
year.166  The district court has little control over senior judges’ workload, 
making magistrate judges—over which the court has more control—a 
more reliable judicial partner in many district courts.  A separate dilemma 
arises for visiting judges.  A visiting judge’s service is more temporary 
 
of a penny per page. But the federal judiciary charges a dime a page to use its service, called Pacer (for 
Public Access to Court Electronic Records).”). 
 162. Mauskopf et al., supra note 32 at 10.   
 163. Id.  
 164. John Gramlich, Only 2% of federal criminal defendants go to trial, and most who do are found 
guilty, PEW RES. CTR. (June 11, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/11/only-2-of-
federal-criminal-defendants-go-to-trial-and-most-who-do-are-found-guilty/.  
 165. See generally Frederic Block, Senior Status: An Active Senior Judge Corrects Some Common 
Misunderstandings, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 533 (2007).  
 166. Id. at 536.  
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than a magistrate judge’s eight-year term, and anytime a visiting judge 
adjudicates cases in a neighboring court, it abandons cases in its own 
court—a problem that the magistrate judge system does not encounter.  
There are additional arguments stating that some of a magistrate 
judge’s authority violates the limits of the Federal Magistrate Act or 
unconstitutionally infringes on Article III courts.  Most of these concerns, 
though, focus on magistrate judges’ involvement in pretrial criminal 
matters.167  In civil cases, the Supreme Court has viewed magistrate 
judges as a proper (and welcome) member of the district courts.168  
In Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, for example, the 
Court considered “whether Article III allows bankruptcy judges to 
adjudicate . . . claims with the parties’ consent.”169  Although the case 
concerned bankruptcy judges, the result also implicated the magistrate 
judge system since, as the Court noted, Congress authorized both 
bankruptcy and magistrate judges “to assist Article III courts in their 
work.”170  The Court ultimately concluded that it was proper for both 
bankruptcy and magistrate judges to hear full consent cases, finding:  
Bankruptcy judges, like magistrate judges, “are appointed and subject to 
removal by Article III judges.”  They “serve as judicial officers of the 
United States district court” and collectively “constitute a unit of the 
district court” for that district. Just as “[t]he ultimate decision whether to 
invoke [a] magistrate [judge]'s assistance is made by the district court,” 
bankruptcy courts hear matters solely on a district court’s reference, which 
the district court may withdraw sua sponte or at the request of a party.  
“[S]eparation of powers concerns are diminished” when . . . “the decision 
to invoke [a non-Article III] forum is left entirely to the parties and the 
power of the federal judiciary to take jurisdiction remains” in place.171  
The Court concluded that “Congress could choose to rest the full share 
of the Judiciary’s labor on the shoulders of Article III judges.  But doing 
so would require a substantial increase in the number of district 
judgeships.”172  According to the Court, as long as Article I judges “are 
subject to control by the Article III courts, their work poses no threat to 
 
 167. See, e.g., Holt, supra note 64, at 911 (arguing “that the [Federal Magistrate Act] does not 
empower magistrate judges to accept guilty pleas in felony cases”); Tomi Mendel, Note, Efficiency Run 
Amok: Challenging the Authority of Magistrate Judges to Hear and Accept Felony Guilty Pleas, 68 VAND. 
L. REV. 1795, 1796 (2015) (arguing “that the delegation to magistrate judges of felony-guilty-plea 
proceedings, though beneficial to district judges, raises concerns of fairness and constitutionality for 
criminal defendants.”). 
 168. MCCABE, MAGISTRATE JUDGE GUIDE, supra note 68, at 60–66 (reviewing legal 
challenges to bankruptcy and magistrate judges’ authority). 
 169. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1939 (2015).  
 170. Id. at 1938. 
 171. Id. at 1945 (citation omitted).  
 172. Id. at 1946. 
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the separation of powers.”173 
Another (and weaker) criticism could be that magistrate judges are not 
qualified to take on such an important judicial role.  Yet, as discussed 
earlier, judges and scholars have dismissed this notion outright.  So have 
attorneys who litigate in federal court.  In one survey, lawyers who 
regularly practiced in federal courts within the Ninth Circuit were polled 
on their preference of having magistrate judges preside over their civil 
trials.174  In the poll, 85% of respondents “disagreed or strongly disagreed 
with the statement that magistrate judges are less likely than district 
judges to rule correctly,” and only 7% of respondents “never consent to 
have a magistrate judge conduct their civil trials.”175  On this issue, one 
corporate attorney wrote that many “clients complain that civil litigation 
takes too long” and noted that “[c]onsenting to civil trial by a Magistrate 
Judge best serves the goals of a corporate client.”176  
Furthermore, recall that merit selection panels are encouraged to 
recommend magistrate judge nominees “who possess the same types of 
personal and professional qualities expected of district judges.”177  This 
recommendation exists for an important reason: A number of magistrate 
judges ultimately become district judges.  According to a 2017 
Congressional Research Service report, the third most common 
professional experience immediately prior to becoming a district judge 
was serving as a magistrate judge.178  President Donald Trump’s judicial 
nominees have followed this trend, as over twenty of them have served as 
federal magistrate judges.179  For example, one nominee, Bridget Shelton 
Bade, served as a magistrate judge in the District of Arizona before her 
recent elevation to the Ninth Circuit.180  These nominees have the unique 
experience of having their record and experience scrutinized by a merit 
selection panel, district judges, and now the U.S. Senate, which 
 
 173. Id.  
 174. John F. Murtha, Why do Lawyers Elect, or Not Elect, to have Magistrate Judges Conduct their 
Civil Trials?, 11:11 Fed. Bar Ass’n, Idaho Ch. 8 (2007), https://www.fedbar.org/idaho-chapter//wp-
content/uploads/sites/37/2019/10/July-2007-pdf.pdf. 
 175. Id. at 11.  
 176. Michael J. Bolton, Choosing to Consent to a Magistrate Judge: A Client’s View, THE FED. 
LAWYER, May/June 2014, at 91, https://www.fedbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/PBMJ-feature3-
mayjun14-pdf-1.pdf.  
 177. MAGISTRATE JUDGES DIV., ADMIN OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 82, at 26.  
 178. BARRY J. MCMILLION, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT JUDGES: 
PROFILE OF SELECT CHARACTERISTICS 25–26 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43426.pdf.  
 179. Jimmy Hoover & Andrew Kragie, Law360’s Guide To Trump’s Judicial Picks, LAW360, 
https://www.law360.com/articles/963060/law360-s-guide-to-trump-s-judicial-picks (last updated Feb. 
25, 2020).  
 180. Press Release, U.S. Courts for the Ninth Circuit, Senate Confirms US Magistrate Judge Bridget 
Bade to Seat on Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Mar. 26, 2019), 
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/ce9/2019/03/26/Bade_Confirmed.pdf.  
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exemplifies their professional competence, ability as jurists, and respect 
among their legal peers.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The current dearth of district judgeships has placed real-world burdens 
on the courts and those seeking justice through them.  An expansion of 
the magistrate judge system would serve as a short-term solution to this 
very real crisis.  
Most importantly, the ingrained flexibility of the magistrate judge 
system provides district courts the discretion to use magistrate judges as 
they see fit.  Different district courts have different needs, and magistrate 
judges can help fulfill them.  Depending on the district, magistrate judges 
can be used to resolve specific case types, be tasked with pretrial matters 
and mediation, or (with consent) be given a docket nearly identical to that 
of a district judge.  
Most relevant to lawmakers, an expansion of the system should 
encounter little political opposition.  Because the magistrate judge system 
is an Article I creation, it sidesteps the oft-partisan Article III nomination 
and confirmation process.  Furthermore, although the growth of the 
magistrate judge system would require additional appropriation, given the 
marginal cost, it would be possible for Congress to identify a reasonable 
offset.  
Even without Senate scrutiny, there should be little concern about 
magistrate judges’ qualifications or their ability to do their job.  The 
selection process ensures that nominees are selected based on merit, and 
district judges have an overwhelming incentive to pick candidates who 
can do the job quickly and competently.  There is also no reason to worry 
that magistrate judges would bypass district judges’ authority.  Without 
full consent by civil parties, district judges have the final say over a 
magistrate judge’s rulings.  
To improve the judiciary’s capacity, Congress has the chance to crawl 
before it walks.  For a small slice of  its annual appropriation to the federal 
courts, Congress can greatly expand the magistrate judge system and 
thereby offer temporary relief to an overburdened district court system.  
In the meantime, Congress can focus on building the political consensus 
to pass a significant judgeships bill, just as it did thirty years ago.  
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